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I. INTRODUCTION 
Dr. David Capper’s paper on The Assignment of a Bare Right to Litigate 
is a response to the Irish treatment of champerty and maintenance.1 It is 
judicious in its treatment of recent Irish and other common law precedent, 
and the conclusion it draws is a cautious one. Capper appears to sympathize 
with the concerns raised by courts in the United Kingdom, and elsewhere in 
the Commonwealth, but prefers the balance struck by the English Court of 
Appeal in Simpson v. Norfolk & Norwich University Hospital NHS Trust2 
and finds fault in the Irish Supreme Court’s decision in SPV Osus Ltd. v. 
HSBC Institutional Trust Services (Ireland).3 
In this short paper, I will attempt to draw some parallels between the 
treatment of champerty and maintenance in the United States and the 
Commonwealth courts and use various American approaches to illustrate the 
limitations of the approach endorsed by Capper. 
Capper’s paper makes two major claims, although he spends the bulk of 
his analysis on the second. The first, which comes early in the paper, is that 
maintenance is less offensive to the law of champerty than the assignment of 
“bare” claims.4 The second is that the law of champerty can, and ought to, 
 
* Fellow, Center on Civil Justice, NYU School of Law 2019–20, and Professor of Law, Benjamin N. 
Cardozo School of Law, New York, N.Y. 
1 David Capper, The Assignment of a Bare Right to Litigate (unpublished manuscript) (on file 
with author). 
2 Simpson v. Norfolk & Norwich Univ. Hosp. NHS Tr. [2011] EWCA (Civ) 1149, [2012] QB 640 
(Eng.). 
3 SPV Osus Ltd. v. HSBC Institutional Tr. Servs. Ltd. & Ors [2018] IESC 44 (Ir.). 
4 Capper, supra note 1, at 3–4. 
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distinguish the assignment of bare claims from other types of assignment and 
that the historical trend of allowing the assignment of choses of action should 
not be extended to bare assignments.5 I observe that in the United States, at 
least, there is great resistance to the first claim. I agree with Capper’s second 
claim but disagree (I think) with the definition of bare assignment he offers. 
As far as I can tell, like Lord Denning in Trendtex Trading Corp. v. Credit 
Suisse,6 I would go further than almost any common law court has yet been 
willing to go and permit assignments that are almost fully naked. 
II. ASSIGNMENT AND MAINTENANCE DEFINED 
An assignment is the act of transferring to another all or part of one’s 
property, interest, or rights.7 While the early common law rejected all 
assignments of a cause of action, regardless of whether it was based in 
contract or tort, that restriction eventually shrank until courts could state the 
modern rule was that “assignability of things [in action] is now the rule; non-
assignability, the exception; and this exception is confined to wrongs done to 
the person, the reputation, or the feelings of the injured party.”8 
Maintenance is the “assistance in prosecuting or defending a lawsuit 
given to a litigant by someone who has no bona fide interest in the case [or] 
meddling in someone else’s litigation.”9 Champerty is a species of 
maintenance. Champerty is “[a]n agreement between a stranger to a lawsuit 
and a litigant by which the stranger pursues the litigant’s claim as 
consideration for receiving part of any judgment proceeds.”10 The chief 
difference between maintenance and champerty is that the maintainer is not 
rewarded for his support of the litigant.11  
As Capper notes, quoting Brownton, often the motivation, or interest, 
behind maintenance and assignment is identical—to secure the legal claims 
 
5 Id. at 5. 
6 Trendtex Trading Corp. v. Crédit Suisse [1980] 1 QB 629 (Eng.). 
7  “Ordinarily, the word ‘assignment’ is limited in its application to a transfer of intangible rights, 
including contractual rights, choses in action, and rights in or connected with property, as distinguished 
from a transfer of the property itself.” 6 AM. JUR. 2D Assignments § 1 (1963). 
8  Webb v. Pillsbury, 144 P.2d 1, 3 (Cal. 1943) (quoting 242 CAL. JUR. 3D § 5). In addition, most 
states will not permit the assignment of breach of contract claims that are of a “purely personal nature,” 
such as promises of marriage. 6 AM. JUR. 2D Assignments §§ 29–30 (1963). 
9  Barratry, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 973 (8th ed. 2004). Barratry is also a species of 
maintenance: it is the practice of frequently exciting or stirring up suits in others. In other words, someone 
who engages in maintenance or champerty once has not committed barratry but may nonetheless have 
violated the prohibition on champerty or maintenance. Id. at 160. 
10  Id. at 246.  
11  “‘[P]ut simply, maintenance is helping another prosecute a suit; champerty is maintaining a suit 
in return for a financial interest in the outcome; and barratry is a continuing practice of maintenance or 
champerty.’” Osprey, Inc. v. Cabana Ltd. P’ship, 532 S.E.2d 269, 273 (S.C. 2000) (quoting In re Primus, 
436 U.S. 412, 424 n.15 (1978)). 
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held by some original claimant.12 The difference between maintenance and 
assignment is, technically, that in the former, the original claimant remains 
in control of the claim, while in the latter, the original claimant is substituted 
by the new party. In the common law, the general trend was to liberalize 
assignment first, then champerty. Ireland is an example of a common law 
system that has not followed this path, as the holding in SPV Osus 
illustrates.13  
It may be the case that by now, the liberalization of champerty has 
progressed in England and Australia to the point where were there any 
limitation on assignment, a party interested in supporting litigation could find 
a way around by providing maintenance. This is, I believe, what Capper 
suggests when he observes that the assignee in Simpson could have supported 
the assignor’s malpractice claim under the English law of maintenance, just 
as the union did in Hill.14 Of course, in Ireland, this solution is unavailable, 
since it has refused to follow other common law systems that have liberalized 
their law of champerty and holds that all third party maintenance by strangers 
(especially for profit) is illegal.  
In the United States, the situation is complex and depends on individual 
state jurisdictions. Modern commentary in American common law often 
blends together the legal doctrines that place limits on assignment and 
maintenance, conflating the former into champerty.15 It is important to keep 
the two sets of limitations separate notwithstanding the fact that fear of 
champerty has always been the most common justification for limitations on 
assignment.16 If that justification were abandoned, one could still have 
restrictions on different forms of maintenance in a world where there were 
no limitations on assignment. One could argue, in fact, that this is the state of 
affairs towards which American law has been moving over the past century. 
After all, champerty is still technically illegal in almost half of American 
states, while, according to the United States Supreme Court, courts have 
 
12 Capper, supra note 1, at 3 (quoting Brownton Ltd v. Edward Moore Inbucom Ltd [1985] 3 All 
ER 499 (CA)). 
13 Ireland continues to prohibit forms of third-party litigation finance that would be permitted in 
England, despite the fact that its law of assignment has followed a similar to trajectory as England’s. See 
SPV Osus Ltd. v. HSBC Institutional Tr. Servs. (Ireland) Ltd. [2018] IESC 44, ¶ 30 (citing Persona Dig. 
Telephony Ltd. v. Minister for Pub. Enter. [2017] IESC 27 (SC)); David Capper, Third Party Litigation 
Funding in Ireland: Time for Change?, 37 CIV. JUST. Q. 193 (2018). 
14 Capper, supra note 1, at 5. 
15 EDMOND H. BODKIN, THE LAW OF MAINTENANCE AND CHAMPERTY 6–7 (1935) (“Inseparably 
bound up with the historical development of the law of maintenance, although totally distinct from that 
law in origin, is the doctrine of the non-assignability of choses in action.”). 
16 Id. at 7–8 (“[M]aintenance was in fact assigned by the Courts as the reason for the non-
assignability of choses in action . . . .”). 
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broadly liberalized “the rules that prevented assignments of choses in 
action.”17  
The United States Chamber of Commerce, which represents the interests 
of commercial actors, is currently urging the Federal Rules Committee to 
adopt third party funder disclosure rules. Its arguments reflect the traditional 
skepticism of champerty in the United States:  
[M]andatory [third-party funding] disclosure . . . is critical 
to the “integrity of the adversary process” because these 
arrangements threaten core ethical and legal principles that 
undergird our civil justice system. . . . [c]hamperty is a 
centuries-old legal doctrine that prohibits someone from 
funding litigation in which he or she is not a party. . . . 
Although the TPLF industry has promoted the view that this 
doctrine has become a “dead letter,” recent state and federal 
court decisions have given renewed vitality to champerty 
principles, particularly in the TPLF arena.18 
The Chamber is not an isolated voice in reminding us that champerty is 
still viewed with suspicion in the United States: not only are states like 
Georgia, Kentucky, Minnesota, and Pennsylvania actively prohibiting 
champerty, other states, if they permit it, have taken steps to regulate it out 
of existence by placing it under their state usury laws.19 
The conflation of assignment and champerty can be seen in two 
representative cases from the nineteenth century: Poe v. Davis (1857)20 and 
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Fuller (1891).21 In Poe, the assignors, 
who were locked in a protracted probate battle with other putative heirs, 
assigned their right to the estate for $100 to the assignees, who had no 
connection with the estate. The Alabama Supreme Court voided the 
assignment on a motion from the assignors after the probate litigation was 
won by the assignees. The court cited Lord Abinger’s views in Prosser v. 
Edmonds22 to support its conclusion that the estate claimed by the assignees 
was a “mere naked right.”23 The court noted that although the assignees “may 
have acted very discreetly and fairly in the management of the litigation,” the 
fact that they paid $100 for an estate worth perhaps $1,000 (but with no 
 
17 Sprint Commc’ns Co., L.P. v. APCC Servs., Inc., 554 U.S. 269, 276 (2008). 
18 See, e.g., U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, SELLING LAWSUITS, BUYING TROUBLE: 
THIRD PARTY LITIGATION FUNDING IN THE UNITED STATES 4 (2009). 
19 See, e.g., Tennessee and Arkansas. 
20 Poe v. Davis, 29 Ala. 676 (1857). 
21 Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Fuller, 23 A. 193 (1891). 
22 Prosser v. Edmonds (1835) 160 Eng. Rep. 196. 
23 Poe, 29 Ala. at 682. 
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guarantee of the outcome) proved that they were speculators.24 To prove that 
there was an impermissible speculative motive behind the assignment, the 
court cited the fact the assignees had offered to indemnify the assignors any 
potential costs that could be imposed upon them by the court at the conclusion 
of the suit. The court said that an assignment which “savor[ed] of 
maintenance” was one in which the assignee undertook to pay “for any costs, 
or make any advances” beyond the cost of pursuing the suit after the 
assignment.25 In Poe an assignment “savored of” maintenance because the 
legal claim assigned was clearly sold for to another who hoped to profit from 
its enforcement. 
In Metropolitan Life, the Connecticut Supreme Court upheld the 
assignment of an unspecified number of identical fraud claims to Fuller, the 
assignee. Both the assignor and the assignees had purchased life insurance 
policies from Metropolitan Life, which they then surrendered to the insurer 
for a fraction of what they claimed were the policies’ true surrender value. 
Fuller successfully sued the insurer in an earlier, separate case in New York 
and then purchased from other insureds their claims for fraud. He purchased 
the claims for a dollar and offered to divide the recoveries with the assignors. 
The insurer asked to have the assignments declared void because they were 
champertous and against public policy.26 The court refused, noting that, 
although in the past, “public policy was opposed to champerty and 
maintenance, and therefore all contracts which savored of these vices were 
void. . . . modern [law] is the reverse.”27 Absolute prohibition of all 
maintenance or champerty would not “generally promote justice” and 
therefore “the true inquiry may therefore be limited exclusively” to the merits 
of each transaction.28 The court conceded that Fuller had taken “naked” or 
“bare” assignments, at least in the sense that these terms had been adopted 
by American courts following Lord Abinger’s opinion in Prosser.29 
However, the court held that earlier judicial hostility to the assignment of “a 
mere right of action to procure a transaction to be set aside on the ground of 
fraud,” had to be balanced against the positive social consequences of 
allowing men like Fuller to bundle together the assignors’ claims (in what 
was, in effect, a class action).30 Unlike the Poe court, the Metropolitan Life 
 
24 Id. at 681. 
25 Id. at 682 (quoting 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1050h). 
26 Metro. Life Ins. Co., 23 A. at 196. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 It would manifestly be both useful and convenient to policy-holders of the plaintiff, residing in 
this state, who . . . having . . . just demands, the individual enforcement of which, to any person in 
ordinary circumstances, would be so expensive and difficult as to amount to a practical impossibility, 
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court was not concerned with the fact that Fuller, who was motivated by pure, 
speculative greed, and that the assignors, were seeking to enjoy a reward from 
claims that they were not willing to pursue on their own.31  
Poe and Metropolitan Life demonstrate that the struggle of the limits of 
assignment in the United States were indistinguishable from the struggle over 
the permissibility of champerty. As Poe demonstrates, this concern, when it 
was made explicit, often took the form of a censorious view of speculation in 
litigation. But the Poe court’s hostility to the assignment of the estate at issue 
in the case reveals more than just a concern for the specter of third parties 
profiting from litigation. It also reveals a concern with the impermissible 
motives that might lay behind the original claim holder’s reasons for 
permitting his or her claim to go forward in the hands of another person. By 
the time Lord Abinger set out his rule in Prosser, the idea that a chose in 
action could be transferred to a stranger in property and contract was familiar, 
and it certainly must have been the case that these assignments, when they 
occurred, reflected a speculative appetite.32 The Poe court’s hostility to the 
transaction it struck down was explicitly based on its disgust at the assignor’s 
desire to be indemnified for, and protected from, its prior decision to claim a 
right rather than the assignee’s desire to profit from the case. The court cited 
approvingly Lord Abinger’s observation in Prosser that “[a]ll our cases of 
maintenance and champerty are founded on the principle, that no 
encouragement should be given to litigation, by the introduction of parties to 
enforce those rights, which others are not disposed to enforce.”33 This 
suspicion of claims that were of such little importance to the original victims, 
that they would not have cared if they had been brought, can be seen in other 
cases contemporary with Poe, such as Gruber v. Baker,34 where the court 
condemned as “bare” an assignment of a chose of action by a victim of fraud 
in a land sale in exchange for a right to recover the land if the assignee was 
successful.35 As the Gruber court explained: 
The reason of the rule . . . is to prevent litigation and the 
prosecution of doubtful claims by strangers . . . . If the owner 
 
that a more fortunate person, of experience, ability and inclination, should assist them, and wait for 
his compensation until the suits were determined, and be paid out of the fruits of them. 
Id. 
31 “[W]hatever was the motive of the defendants, whether selfish or philanthropic . . . we can 
discover no rule of public policy that would be thereby violated.” Id. at 196–97. 
32 As Capper notes, “an assignee needs an incentive for taking on the risk that the case will be 
lost.” Capper, supra note 1, at 6 (citing Y.L. Tan, Champertous Contracts and Assignments, 106 L.Q. 
REV. 656, 675–78 (1990)). 
33 Poe v. Davis, 29 Ala. 676, 681 (1857) (citing Prosser v. Edmonds (1835) 160 Eng. Rep. 196) 
(emphasis added).  
34 Gruber v. Baker, 23 P. 858 (Nev. 1890).  
35 As compensation for her troubles, Gruber was to divide the damages (if any) arising from the 
fraud action. Id. at 866.  
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is not disposed to attempt the enforcement of a doubtful 
claim, public policy requires that he should not be allowed 
to transfer his right to another party for the purpose of 
prosecution, thereby encouraging strife and litigation.36 
Lest I leave the impression that the conflation of champerty and certain 
types of assignments is an anachronistic holdover from the past century, it is 
easy to see the traces of the conflation in modern cases. For example, 
Maryland will not recognize assignments which are part of a “scheme to 
promote litigation for the benefit of the promoter rather than for the benefit 
of the litigant or the public.”37 In Accrued Financial Services, a company 
with expertise in forensic accounting took assignments of the legal claims of 
commercial tenants in over fifty shopping malls and promised to remit to the 
assignors between 50–60% of any discrepancies discovered and paid to the 
company by the assignors’ landlords, some of which were in Maryland. The 
court held that this practice violated Maryland’s prohibition on champerty. It 
should be noted, as the dissent did, that the court had no reason to suspect 
that the claims brought by the assignee were weak or fraudulent; in fact, quite 
the opposite was probably the case; the parties complaining— the assignors’ 
landlords—probably were concerned that they were facing an adversary with 
resources and skills equal to their own.38 The court ruled the assignments 
illegal because they were motivated by a desire to profit from the assignee’s 
superior position vis-à-vis the assignors: 
[The] rights were assigned, not in exchange for an existing 
value, but for future fees to be determined by decisions and 
value judgments controlled by [the assignee], who had no 
interest in the underlying claims. . . . As such, [the assignee] 
was given the power to mine lawsuits, promote them, and 
profit off of them without regard to the interests and desires 
of the injured party.39 
In New York, a federal court recently applied New York’s statutory 
prohibition on assignments, New York Judiciary Law Section 489. In BSC 
Associates v. Leidos, Inc.40 a small, family-owned computer software 
company was faced with a financial crisis when its largest (perhaps only) 
client, a defense contractor (Leidos), did not pay it due to a dispute with the 
ultimate customer, the U.S. Government. Rather than go bankrupt, it 
arranged a sale of most of its assets to another firm but carved out its potential 
claims against Leidos which were assigned a newly formed special purpose 
 
36 Id. at 862 (emphasis added). 
37 Accrued Fin. Servs. v. Prime Retail, Inc., 298 F.3d 291, 299 (4th Cir. 2002). 
38 Id. at 306 (assignees brought “serious,” not frivolous, suits). 
39 Id. at 299 (emphasis added). 
40 BSC Assocs. v. Leidos, Inc., 91 F. Supp. 3d 319 (N.D.N.Y. 2015). 
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vehicle owned by the family. The final resting place for the legal claims was 
a company called “BSC Associates,” which did not make anything and had 
no physical offices; it existed, one may assume, just so a family who once 
had a thriving software business could sue Leidos. The court held that the 
suit against Leidos had to be dismissed because BSC Associates had taken 
the claims—which were for damages arising from a breach of contract and 
unjust enrichment—for no other reason than to sue to collect the damages. 
The court said that it is one thing for a stranger to sue in order to collect a 
debt assigned to her by the original lender, or for a stranger to sue to enforce 
rights acquired in bankruptcy, or for a stranger to acquire a claim as part of a 
deal to acquire operating assets, but taking an assignment for a chose in action 
unconnected to any other property was champerty and was therefore 
impermissible.41 
III. WHEN IS A CLAIM BARE? 
If in many common-law systems third-party funding can be used to 
provide the funds needed to enforce a claim where assignment is prohibited, 
what other than choice among forms is lost in cases like Poe, Accrued 
Financial Services, and BSC Associates? The answer is, possibly very little.42 
In New York, for example, the family who owned the company injured by 
the contractor in BSC Associates could, in theory, have availed themselves of 
one of New York’s many third-party funders. New York Judiciary Law 
Section 489 has never been interpreted to prohibit contracts to maintain 
litigation in exchange for a portion of proceeds short of assignment.43 But 
New York could be considered a special case since its doctrines of champerty 
and maintenance were replaced by a statute that explicitly limits the scope of 
the prohibition to assignments. The other states discussed above (Maryland, 
Connecticut, and California) make no such distinction.44 
If in some U.S. jurisdictions third-party financing will not be able to step 
in and take up the slack left by the prohibition of champertous assignments, 
then these states would be in the same position Capper describes as the 
current state in Ireland. For those jurisdictions, it would be important to know 
 
41 In another case applying New York law, the court considered a transaction remarkably similar 
to the transaction in Poe and found it champertous. See Vardanyan v. Close-Up Int’l, No. CV-06-2243 
(DGT), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88292, at *22 n.4 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2007) (“Moreover, the only 
consideration given by plaintiff in exchange for the Abramov shares was a promise to sue Close-Up for 
the money allegedly owed to Abramov. . . . This arrangement bears all of the earmarks of champerty.”). 
42 Capper’s paper makes a slightly different point. Capper starts from the acceptance by most 
common law jurisdictions of third-party litigation finance and then asks if assigning the right to litigate 
automatically follows. He expresses doubts whether it does. 
43 See Fahrenholz v. Sec. Mut. Ins. Co., 788 N.Y.S.2d 546 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004). 
44 Neither does Pennsylvania. See, e.g., Riffin v. Conrail Rail Corp., 363 F. Supp. 3d 569 (E.D. 
Pa. 2019). 
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what counts as a “bare” assignment since this category describes a space 
where third-party support for litigation is simply not available under any 
form. 
First, let us look at answers offered by some of the cases reviewed by 
Capper. In Simpson, Moore-Bick LJ said an interest is sufficient to render an 
assignment “not bare” (or “covered”) when it is “supported by an interest of 
a kind sufficient to justify the assignee’s pursuit of proceedings for his own 
benefit.”45 This verges on a tautology. It may be said that Moore-Bick LJ was 
merely trying to give a gloss on the more familiar test used by Lord Roskill 
in Trendtex Trading, which was to say that an assignment is not bare if the 
assignee has a “genuine commercial interest” in the resolution of the chose 
in action.46 While not tautological, a lot rests on the meaning of the word 
“genuine.” In Casehub, the assignee was a commercial aggregator whose 
only interest was to share in a stranger’s consumer claim by returning 60% 
of any recovery to the assignor/consumer.47 The interest held by the assignee 
was “genuinely” commercial, in the sense that it was motivated by a desire 
for profit, as opposed to the assignee in Simpson, who had a political or social 
interest. But it was not a commercial interest incidental to any property to 
which the assignee had title. Nor was it a commercial interest that pre-existed 
the assignment, as in JEB Recoveries v. Binstock.48 
Capper suggests that the assignment in SPV Osus should not have been 
condemned by the Irish court as bare, and that the result—the loss of an 
opportunity by unsecured creditors to receive money sooner than later in a 
complex insolvency—makes little sense from the perspective of public 
policy.49 The test offered by the Irish court sweeps more broadly than Capper 
thinks is necessary or advisable. The court found the assignments bare 
because the assignees neither had (1) any commercial interest incidental to 
any property to which the assignee had title nor (2) a commercial interest that 
pre-existed the assignment. I agree with Capper on this point. But I am not 
sure that I agree with Capper’s reasons for criticizing the SPV Osus decision.  
My quibble with Capper is this: Is the basis for his critique of the SPV 
Osus decision its focus on the motive of the assignee or the fact that the 
assignee had no connection to the chose in action but for the assignment? The 
phrase “genuine commercial interest” can be read narrowly or broadly. The 
narrow reading would allow assignments where the assignee had no 
 
45 Simpson v. Norfolk & Norwich Univ. Hosp. NHS Tr. [2011] EWCA (Civ) 1149 [15], [2012] 
QB 640 (Eng.).  
46 Trendtex Trading Corp. v. Crédit Suisse [1982] AC 679 at 703. Capper cites to Equuscorp Pty 
Ltd v Haxton, [2012] HCA 7, for an Australian version of the same test. Capper, supra note 1, at 17. 
47 Casehub Ltd. v. Wolf Cola Ltd. [2017] 5 Costs LR 835, discussed by Capper, supra note 1, at 
17–18. 
48 JEB Recoveries LLP v. Binstock [2015] EWHC 1063 (Ch). 
49 Capper, supra note 1, at 8. 
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connection to the chose in action but for the assignment, as long as the 
assignee’s motive was to secure one a certain class of “legitimate” ends. The 
latter would prohibit assignments where the assignee had no connection to 
the chose in action under any circumstances subject to two narrow exceptions 
(where the assignee possessed title property connected to the chose in action 
or had an equitable interest connected to the chose in action that pre-existed 
the assignment).  
Capper endorses the former reading—at least, this is the impression one 
gets from his treatment of Simpson—which he appears to approve, and Body 
Corporate 160361 (Fleetwood Apartments) v. BC 2004 Ltd. & BC 2009 
Ltd.,50 which he also appears to approve. In Simpson, the assignee did not 
have a profit-seeking motive—she took the assignment in order to secure a 
non-economic end—which was to improve medical safety by enforcing a 
stranger’s otherwise valid malpractice claim. She was a classic example of 
Abinger’s officious intermeddler, since she was seeking to enforce a claim 
that the assignor “was not disposed to enforce.”51 The assignee’s motive was 
illegitimate, according to Capper, because her ends were inconsistent with 
the “administration of justice,” since the assignee was patently uninterested 
in resolving the claim based on the “merits of the case.”52 
The assignee in Body Corporate, on the other hand, had a profit-seeking 
motive but took the assignment in order to secure an end that could not have 
been achieved had the claim remained with the original claimholder. The 
assignee was one of three defendants sued by the assignor. The settlement 
provided the plaintiff with $1.5M NZD in exchange for a release and the 
assignment of the plaintiff’s claims against the remaining defendants, with 
the understanding that the assignee would only keep $1.5M NZD and some 
legal costs and pass any surplus onto the plaintiff. The court accepted the 
other two defendants’ argument that the assignment was a scheme designed 
to impose onto the other non-settling defendants more of the share of the 
liability than would have otherwise been assigned them had there been no 
settlement/assignment with the plaintiff because it would permit the first 
defendant to evade New Zealand’s rules of contribution between joint 
tortfeasors.53 Here, the assignment was not legitimate because its end was to 
 
50 Body Corporate 160361 (Fleetwood Apartments) v. BC 2004 Ltd. & BC 2009 Ltd. [2014] NZHC 
1514, [2014] 3 NZLR 758 (N.Z.). 
51 See Prosser v. Edmonds (1835) 160 Eng. Rep 196. 
52 Capper, supra note 1, at 6. 
53 The goal of the assignment on the part of the [first defendant] is to reduce the amount that it 
would otherwise have to pay after a combination of a trial leading to a judgment and then a second 
hearing leading to apportionment of the judgment sum under the Law Reform Act 1936. For 
otherwise the assignment would not have been entered into. 
Body Corporate, [2014] 3 NZLR 758 (HC) at [130] (Fogarty J). 
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secure an economic advantage that was, according to Capper, “unmerited.”54 
In his view, the assignment was an abuse of process. 
Before examining the principle that can be teased out from these cases, 
it must be observed that American courts have seen fact patterns that parallel 
cases like Simpson and Body Corporate. Lili Levi has catalogued a variety of 
non-economically motivated campaigns by third-party funders to burden or 
bankrupt media defendants who have offended wealthy political actors.55 In 
one infamous example, a wealthy venture capitalist funded a privacy claim 
against Gawker Media.56 Although not an assignment (since personal torts 
cannot be assigned in Florida), the policy concerns raised by Capper were 
potentially present in the third-party funding relationship, given the reports 
that the funder exercised control over the litigation to the point of instructing 
the claimant to refuse a reasonable settlement offer.57 Third-party funding for 
non-economic reasons has appeared in other contexts, including, for 
example, the funding of a personal injury suit against the Church of 
Scientology.58  
On the other hand, concern about abuse of process has proven fatal to 
economically-motivated assignments in New York, paralleling the concern 
expressed by Capper about Body Corporate. In Justinian Capital SPC v. 
WestLB AG,59 the assignee was the purchaser of distressed subordinated debt 
who sued the financial institution that managed the issuers of the notes. The 
New York Court of Appeals found that the agreement between the plaintiff 
and assignor, the original purchaser of the notes, was champertous in 
violation of Judiciary Law section 489 because “there was no evidence” that 
the plaintiff-assignee’s acquisition of the notes was for any purpose other 
than litigation.60 The assignee paid nothing for assignment and promised to 
remit 85% of any verdict or settlement to the assignor. The Court of Appeals 
 
54 Capper, supra note 1, at 21. 
55 Lili Levi, The Weaponized Lawsuit Against the Media: Litigation Funding as a New Threat to 
Journalism, 66 AM. U. L. REV. 761 (2017). 
56 Ryan Mac & Matt Drange, This Silicon Valley Billionaire Has Been Secretly Funding Hulk 
Hogan’s Lawsuits Against Gawker, FORBES (May 24, 2016, 7:29 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/ryanmac/2016/05/24/this-silicon-valley-billionaire-has-been-secretly-
funding-hulk-hogans-lawsuits-against-gawker/#33926c528d14. 
57 See Felix Salmon, Peter Thiel Just Gave Other Billionaires a Dangerous Blueprint for 
Perverting Philanthropy, SPLINTER (May 25, 2016, 10:30 PM), https://splinternews.com/peter-thiel-just-
gave-other-billionaires-a-dangerous-bl-1793857041 (“Hogan could have accepted a substantial financial 
settlement; he could also have made it much more likely that he would get paid, by suing in such a manner 
as to make Gawker’s insurance company liable for any verdict. Instead, he refused all settlements, and 
withdrew the insurable complaints, to ensure that the company itself would incur as much damage as 
possible.”). 
58 Estate of McPherson v. Church of Scientology Flag Serv. Org., 815 So. 2d 678 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2002). 
59 Justinian Capital SPC v. WestLB AG, 65 N.E.3d 1253, 1255 (N.Y. 2016). 
60 Id. at 1257, 1259. 
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focused on its findings that the plaintiff was a shell company, with little or 
no assets, that acquired the notes following the assignor’s determination not 
to sue in its own name for political reasons since it received funding from the 
German government, which was also a part owner of the defendant.  
IV. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN IRRATIONAL ASSIGNEES AND 
COLLUSIVE ASSIGNEES 
The test for legitimacy sketched out by Capper’s sympathetic treatment 
of Simpson and Body Corporate is unsatisfactory because it endeavors to 
address two different concerns without explaining how they are related. The 
concern addressed in Simpson is that the “normal” operation of civil litigation 
will be derailed by abnormal interests, such as the desire to use the litigation 
as a platform to publicize a matter of public importance, such as medical 
negligence. This is related, but not identical, to the concern that one might 
have in the American third-party funding cases against Gawker and the 
Church of Scientology, where the abnormal interest appears to be a desire to 
punish, not to secure compensation. In all of these cases, the chief 
characteristic of the illegitimate motive is that the assignee is not susceptible 
to a settlement offer that is rational from the perspective for a rational actor. 
The concern addressed in Body Corporate is that the “normal” operation 
of civil litigation will be derailed by pretextual use of rules that are written in 
general terms but require good faith for their application. The reason for the 
court’s hostility to the assignment in Body Corporate is identical to the reason 
for the court’s hostility to the assignment in Justinian. In both cases, the 
assignor and the assignee took advantage of the law of assignment to achieve 
an end in tension with other parts of the law. In Body Corporate, the assignees 
wanted to evade the equitable rules of contribution among joint tortfeasors, 
while in Justinian the assignees (apparently) wanted to evade identification 
as the real party in interest. 
It is not clear what these two concerns have to do with each other, and, 
more importantly, it is not clear why they should be treated with the same 
legal prophylactic or even labeled under the same legal category. I am 
unpersuaded that assignments motivated by non-economic ends of the sort in 
Simpson cause such “undue prejudice to defendants” that they pose a 
significant risk to the administration of justice.61 As Eugene Kontorovich has 
observed, while the volume of dollars directed to suits for non-economic 
reasons is small, the role played by third-party funders who were motivated 
by political and social concerns in the decline of champerty in the United 
States cannot be ignored: “One of the final blows for the doctrine was the 
Supreme Court’s decision in NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963), holding 
 
61 See Capper, supra note 1, at 6–7. 
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Virginia’s champerty and maintenance laws violated the First Amendment, 
because litigation—and the sponsorship of it—is a vehicle for expressing 
viewpoints.”62 This is not to deny that stubborn assignees might not refuse to 
settle at a price that would satisfy an assignee or her agent who was motivated 
purely by a desire to maximize their welfare. Thus, it is surely right that the 
assignment of claims in Simpson (or in the Gawker or Scientology cases) 
would lead to cases taking more time, resulting in higher costs for the 
defendant without any commensurate welfare gains for the original claimant. 
But it is not clear why the baseline for evaluating the administration of justice 
ought to be that of a profit maximizer, such as an insurer to whom a claim 
has been subrogated, as opposed to a party seeking to enforce a valid claim 
for reasons other than economic reasons.63 
In the United States, while some opponents like the US Chamber of 
Commerce have focused on the potential costs arising from additional (and 
putatively frivolous) litigation resulting from the liberalization of the laws 
relating to champerty, others have focused on the specific risk arising from 
third-party funding’s opacity. Maya Steinitz has argued that there may be a 
public interest in disclosure of third-party funding.64 As she put it, “not-for-
profit funders, may be concerned with (their version of) the public interest 
but, of course, what constitutes and furthers the ‘public’s interest’ is often a 
contested matter.”65 She provided this illustration:  
In March of 2016, documents revealed . . . that agricultural 
groups—including the Iowa Farm Bureau Federation, the 
Iowa Soybean Association, the Iowa Corn Growers 
Association (ICGA) and the Iowa Drainage District 
Association—secretly funded the defense of the Iowa 
lawsuit through a 501(c)3 nonprofit, the Agricultural Legal 
Defense Fund. According to Internal Revenue Service 
documents . . . fertilizer and other agricultural company 
officials make up the bulk of the nonprofit’s officers and 
directors, including representatives from Smith Fertilizer, 
 
62 Eugene Kontorovich, Peter Thiel’s Funding of Hulk Hogan-Gawker Litigation Should Not 
Raise Concerns, WASH. POST (May 26, 2016, 8:19 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-
conspiracy/wp/2016/05/26/peter-thiels-funding-of-hulk-hogan-gawker-litigation-should-not-raise-
concerns/ (characterizing Thiel’s action as fitting into the modern paradigm of ideological litigation). As 
Professor Capper has pointed out to me, in England and Wales third-party funders whose motives are 
political or altruistic are less likely to be required to pay the costs of the successful party than funders 
trying to make a profit. See Hamilton v Al Fayed (No 2) [2003] QB 1175.  
63 There may be some reason to doubt that settlement is preferred by economically rational actors, 
all things being equal. See Ezra Friedman & Abraham L. Wickelgren, No Free Lunch: How Settlement 
Can Reduce the Legal System’s Ability to Induce Efficient Behavior, 61 SMU L. REV. 1355 (2008). 
64 Maya Steinitz, Follow the Money? A Proposed Approach for Disclosure of Litigation Finance 
Agreements, 53 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1073, 1103–04 (2019). 
65 Id. at 1104. 
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Monsanto Co., Growmark, Cargill, Koch Agronomics, 
DuPont Pioneer and the United Services Association.66 
The administration of justice may very well be threatened by third-party 
efforts like the one described by Steinitz, but if it is, the appropriate response 
should be disclosure, not prohibition.67 If Peter Thiel, the NAACP, and Big 
Agribusiness want to force a claim to go to trial, in order to prove a point 
about some matter of social or political importance, they should be able to do 
so as long as their role is open to the court and (perhaps) the public. 
Simpson stands in a different relation to the administration of justice 
than the American cases. Because it is easier to assign causes of action in 
England, the malpractice claim at issue could be assigned (whereas it could 
not be in the Gawker case) and so the identity of the champertor was not 
concealed. That being the case, it is not clear that there were any public policy 
reasons to prohibit the assignment. To my mind, assigning the malpractice 
action was more legitimate than arranging for third-party funding because 
assignment insured more transparency about whose interests were being 
promoted. The fact that the assignee might be less inclined to settle than the 
original claimholder is not one that weighs heavily on one side or the other 
of the question of public policy. 
On the other hand, the pretextual use of civil litigation in Body 
Corporate and Justinian raises concerns that are different from those raised 
by Simpson and the Gawker case. But it is important to define those concerns 
with care. It is true that in both cases the assignor sought to evade an 
undesirable outcome by avoiding being identified as the real party in interest, 
and it is true that the assignee was rewarded—paid, really—for lending itself 
to the assignor. One might even describe the assignee in Justinian in a “sock 
puppet” for hire. While the assignee in Body Corporate was not exactly a 
“sock puppet,” it did act as a mechanism for “laundering” the legal identity 
of the claimholder for no purpose other than avoiding the rules of 
contribution. 
V. TOWARDS A TEST FOR BARE ASSIGNMENTS, BARELY 
What distinguishes the assignments in Justinian and Body Corporate 
from the assignments in Poe, BSC Associates, Accrued Financial Services, 
or SPV Osus, all of which were, in my opinion, incorrectly deemed to be 
“bare” assignments? All of these cases involved commercial motives on the 
 
66 Llewellyn Hinkes-Jones, Open Records Request Exposes Rare Litigation Finance Document, 
BLOOMBERG BNA (Feb. 23, 2017), 
https://web.archive.org/web/20170223223237/https://www.bna.com/iowa-pollution-suit-
n57982084227/. 
67 This was Kontorovich’s suggestion. See Kontorovich, supra note 62.  
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part of the assignor and assignee; that is a trivial observation at this point. 
Here is one suggestion: the difference between Justinian and Body 
Corporate, on the one hand, and Poe, BSC Associates, Accrued Financial 
Services, or SPV Osus, on the other, is that in the first set of cases, the 
assignee profited from doing something with the claim that the assignor 
would not, or could not do, whereas in the second set of cases the assignee 
profited from giving the assignor the discounted value of the claim. In 
Justinian, the court was very disturbed by two features of the deal; first, that 
the assignor was to receive most of the recovery, with very little going to the 
assignee, and second, that the assignee paid nothing out-of-pocket for the 
claim and would only pay for the claim if it recovered proceeds. This meant, 
of course, that the assignor did not have the “bird in the hand,” as Capper 
described the unsecured creditors’ position in SPV Osus.68 In Body 
Corporate, the reward to the assignee was not the profit it would make from 
pursuing the assigned claim (since, like in Justinian, it had to give all the 
surplus to the assignor) but something else: a decrease of its liability. 
In Poe, BSC Associates, Accrued Financial Services, or SPV Osus, the 
focus of the courts was on the assignee’s gain from enforcing the claim—
either the fact that it was disproportionate to the price paid for the assignment 
or simply that it could be “traded on” to other strangers. The Poe court held 
that it was significant that the assignor accepted 10% of the claim’s value and 
promised to indemnify the assignee’s costs; the court concluded from this 
that the claim was so speculative that the assignor, being unwilling to enforce, 
was happy to give it away.69 The court in Accrued Financial Services, almost 
150 years later, emphasized a similar point. It stressed that the assignors had 
no idea what the true value of their claims was and that this indicated that 
they were not genuinely interested in enforcing their claims, regardless of 
their merit.70 Laurent v. Sale and In re Trepca Mines Ltd. (No 2) are common 
law decisions in which concern over the speculative nature of the underlying 
claims assigned “scuppered” (in Capper’s words) what otherwise would have 
been conventional assignments choses of action attached to debt.71 In both 
cases, the courts compared the price paid by the assignee for the value 
received. Like in Accrued Financial Services, the courts focused on the fact 
that when the assignments were made the value of the claims were hard to 
define (e.g., they were speculative) and, as such, it could be assumed that the 
assignors did not view them as holding much value. 
 
68 See Capper, supra note 1, at 4. 
69 Poe v. Davis, 29 Ala. 676, 683 (1857). 
70 Accrued Fin. Servs. v. Prime Retail, Inc., 298 F.3d 291, 299 (4th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he tenants, 
who were the real parties in interest, assigned rights in litigation of which they had no knowledge. . . . 
Because the rights were assigned before their nature, costs and benefits could be assessed, . . . the tenants 
. . . had no opportunity to evaluate whether their prosecution was in [their] interest.”). 
71 Capper, supra note 1, at 13–15. 
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If the concern with the price paid by the assignee is rooted in a concern 
for the assignor’s interests, the basis for this concern is both ill-founded and 
obscure. It is unfounded because there is no evidence that the assignors were 
not able to protect themselves or were not fully aware of their own interests 
when selling their claims. As the dissent in Accrued Financial Services put 
it, “[t]here is every reason to believe that the [assignors], who are large outlet 
store[s] . . . were able to bargain with [the assignees] on equal footing.”72 It 
is obscure because it is not clear why the courts should be concerned with 
claims being given away too cheaply. If there is a problem with the assignee 
paying £1 in Simpson, it is not that the original victim of malpractice deserved 
to be paid more for the claim. The suggestion that a low price indicates a 
weak claim is inconsistent with other cases, such as Metropolitan Life where 
the assignee—having already proven his claim—brought identical claims for 
$1.73 
The concern identified by Capper in SPV Osus—that the intent of the 
assignee was to continue to sell the claims on to other investors—is simply 
the concern expressed by the House of Lords in Trendtex over the trafficking 
in litigation.74 It should be clear that nothing is added to the analysis by using 
the word “trafficking” other than to imply that the profit resulting from the 
assignment will go to someone without a legitimate interest, which is a 
tautology unless independent meaning can be given to the word “legitimate.” 
BCS Associates is instructive in this regard. The circumstances that led the 
assignor to give its claims away were not detailed by the court, but it seems 
that the family who owned the company that suffered the original claims was 
left with no assets after their secured creditors were finished exercising their 
rights. Why the assignor did not declare bankruptcy is irrelevant. It is not 
clear why, under those circumstances, a transfer to a complete stranger of 
litigation assets—the only assets left to the original victim—is against the 
public interest. Again, the stranger’s motives for buying the chose in action 
are irrelevant unless, as in Justinian or Body Corporate, the fact that the 
assignee is being used by the assignor to secure an advantage that would have 
been unavailable to the assignor had the chose in action remained in his or 
her hands. As Justinian and Body Corporate illustrate, the legal device of 
assignment can be used to facilitate transactions that are inconsistent with the 
administration of justice, but the question is not whether a certain legal device 
can be abused, but whether it is especially susceptible to abuse. It is not 
obvious that this conclusion can be drawn about assignment between 
strangers driven by either economic or non-economic motives.  
 
72 Accrued Fin. Servs., 298 F.3d at 306 (“[T]he majority’s argument that the assignments serve 
AFS’s interests more than its clients’ (the tenants’) interests is without any foundation.”). 
73 Jackson v. Deauville Holding Co., 27 P.2d 643 (1933); Wikstrom v. Yolo Fliers Club, 274 P. 
959 (1929); McCord v. Martin, 166 P. 1014, 1015 (1917). 
74 Trendtex Trading Corp. v. Crédit Suisse [1982] AC 679, at 694. 
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VI. CONCLUSION  
The right to redress is central to a legitimate interest held by the 
assignor, and if it cannot be freely alienated, then its value is reduced. It 
would seem that in order to respect the legitimacy of the assignor’s rights in 
private law, the identity of the assignee should not matter in defining when 
an assignment is bare, unless the identity of the assignee tends to reveal 
something about the motives of the parties that is relevant to a decision to 
categorically prohibit the transaction. I have argued that identity is irrelevant 
and that, if the courts must prohibit assignments on a categorical basis, the 
focus should be narrowly focused on the motives of the parties.  
In Section 4, I indicated that a distinction exists between irrational 
assignees—the sort that were barred by the court in Simpson and (perhaps) 
the Gawker case—and collusive assignees—the sort that were barred in Body 
Corporate and Justinian. To the extent that Capper thinks that common law 
courts are correct to treat both types as bare assignments, we disagree. 
Further, the reason why collusive assignments ought to be barred is the 
motive of the assignor. To the extent that the assignee is a willing cooperator 
in the assignor’s scheme and takes a payment or shares in the wrongful 
surplus secured by the assignment on behalf of the assignor, the assignee’s 
motive matters. But the focus should be on the assignor, not the assignee. For 
this reason, I think that cases in the United States such as BSC Associates and 
Accrued Financial Services, as well as SPV Osus in Ireland, are wrongly 
decided. 
 
